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Abstract
Learning is essential in allowing policies and programmes to become adaptive to uncertain and
changing circumstances. In this article, we use the case of the Dutch National Collaboration
Programme on Air Quality (in Dutch: Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit (NSL)) to
argue that the organisation of learning processes influences the extent to which policies and
programmes can adapt. Learning is a diverse process that focuses both on improving knowledge
of the effects of possible policy strategies and on bargaining and negotiation in which we interpret
and make sense of such knowledge. Learning strategies can be organised by either focussing on
exploring new ways to understand and approach problems or on exploiting existing knowledge,
measures and capabilities by optimising and refining them. To be adaptive, it is important to
balance both strategies, as otherwise two main risks might undermine the programmes’ adaptive
capacity. First, there is the risk that the implementation of adaptive programmes is constrained by
premature consensus, constraining the capacity to learn regarding the suitability of, and agree-
ment on, existing problem definitions and programme goals during programme implementation.
Second, there is also the risk of premature programming, constraining the capacity to learn
regarding the suitability of the actions and approaches adopted. What makes the NSL such an
interesting case study is that while the programme was designed to be adaptive on the basis of an
on-going learning process, in practice, it largely failed to do so. On the basis of 67 interviews with
stakeholders in the NSL and two focus group discussions, we show that the NSL failed to
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anticipate both risks. Processes of learning have become marginalised and focused predominantly
on exploitation at the expense of exploration. As such, the NSL convincingly shows how a lack of
organising learning is constraining the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and also
contributes to its possible failure.
Keywords
Programmes, adaptive planning, learning, exploitation, exploration, environment, infrastructure
Introduction
Air pollution is among the most pressing environmental problems challenging the health
and well-being of European Union (EU) citizens (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2001; Guerreiro et al.,
2014). Despite intensified efforts to reduce pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, sulphur
oxides, lead and small particles in ambient air (cf. EC, 1999, 2008), a recent review of the
European Commission concluded that European air quality standards are still being flouted
in more than 130 cities across 23 of the 28 EU member states (EC, 2017). As for example
Busscher et al. (2014) explain, directly addressing the main contributors of urban air pol-
lution, most notably energy production, industry and transportation, runs counter to alter-
native policy demands, such as industrial development, urban expansions or additional
transport infrastructure. In approaching this trade-off between policy ambitions, policies
and programmes that are adaptive and enable a combination of different policy priorities
attract increasing attention, both internationally as well as in the Netherlands (see, e.g. de
Oliveira, 2011; Van der Straeten et al., 2012; van Rij and Korthals Altes, 2014).
The Netherlands, in particular, has developed a National Collaboration Programme on
Air Quality (in Dutch: Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit (NSL)) that
explicitly aims to combine key urban and national policy priorities as spatial and infrastruc-
ture developments with air quality policies – so-called mitigating measures – so as to ensure
that European air quality standards are being met everywhere in the country.
In order for programmes such as the NSL to be adaptive and to accommodate ‘multiple
preferences’, Christensen (1985: 65) argues that these should facilitate a process where either
bargaining ‘may compensate various interests through explicit quid pro quo trades’ or where
‘adapting technology to achieve several goals at the same time’ may ‘mute potential diffi-
culties’. Facilitating bargaining and adapting technology are two strategies the Dutch are
also currently aiming for. On the one hand, the NSL is based on a collaborative effort of
various key governmental departments on different levels of authority. It does so by allow-
ing for bargaining processes where learning can take place on how the air quality objectives
relate to other policy objectives and where consensus among participants about the trade-off
between these objectives might be established. On the other hand, the NSL also explicitly
means to be an adaptive policy programme: ‘the NSL has to be flexible and dynamic to
anticipate changed circumstances and insights that are likely to emerge’ (VROM et al., 2009:
24). To be able to do so, the NSL concentrates on learning about the effectiveness of existing
policy instruments and on the development of new approaches and mitigating measures.
Next to Christensen’s call for ‘adapting technology’, therefore, the NSL also means to create
a process of learning-by-doing, particularly regarding the monitoring of air quality and the
development of strategies that help reduce air pollution. Consequently, the NSL highlights
the importance of adapting to new information and knowledge, with experimenting and
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learning being the prime input for such adaptations to occur. It is a strategy even going a
step further than the advice provided by Christensen in 1985, as it also resonates with more
recent academic work on adapting to uncertainty through processes of learning (e.g.
Brunner, 2010; Chaffin et al., 2016; Folke et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2010; Hadorn, 2016;
Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Reed et al., 2010; Salet et al., 2013; Wyborn et al., 2016).
Over the past four years, we have done extensive research into the NSL. At first, our
research focussed on investigating whether the NSL was able to accommodate both
improved air quality conditions and new spatial and infrastructural developments
(Busscher et al., 2014). After noting that NSL was largely unsuccessful in doing so, we
concluded that a lack of learning and adaptation within the NSL was among the prime
reasons explaining its limited success. This was a surprising conclusion, considering the NSL
was explicitly organised for being adaptive based on ongoing learning. Subsequently, we
continued our research with a focus on investigating this lack of learning and adaptation,
with the ambition to explain why this lack occurred.
We started our investigation by addressing existing academic literature on learning and
adaptation in the face of conditions of uncertainty. We report on this investigation in the
following section, where we explain that processes of learning are far from self-evident and
should be explicitly organised. It is a conclusion that is not explicitly discussed in much
literature on adaptive forms of governing. After introducing our research methodology in
the section Research approach, we continue with our empirical investigation of the organi-
sation of processes of learning and adaptation in the NSL. The subsequent section focuses
on how learning and adaptation was organised in the NSL and how it was supposed to
occur, followed by reports on the learning and adaptation processes in practice. The final
section concludes that the limited success of the NSL can indeed be partly explained by a
poor organisation of processes of learning and adaptation. This also allows us to use this
case to reflect on the theoretical idea of linking learning to adaptive forms of governance by
suggesting such literature should explicitly pay attention to the organisation of processes
of learning.
Coping with uncertainty
The rise of more adaptive forms of governance is among the prime reasons for the recent
attention to processes of learning and adaptation in relation to conditions of uncertainty
(e.g. Chaffin et al., 2016; Hodge and Adams, 2016; Kato and Ahern, 2008). Uncertainty is
often considered with regard to stakeholder perceptions, their behaviour and how interac-
tion between possible conflicting groups might result in different perspectives and choices.
Different people and societal groups tend to have alternative and possibly conflicting per-
spectives on both the objectives to strive for and on the strategies for achieving them. In
response to these uncertainties, planning theorists from the 1980s onwards have started to
perceive rationality as a process of ‘sense making’ between contested interpretations, values
and preferences different stakeholders hold on to (e.g. Dryzek, 1990; Healey, 1997; Innes,
1996). This debate has even dominated planning during the 1990s, culminating in what
Healey (1992) coined the ‘communicative turn’.
While the ‘communicative turn’ became a prominent response to conditions of uncer-
tainty, a second response was almost forgotten in planning theory. This response relates to
processes of learning and experimentation as means to try to reduce uncertainties with
regard to the object of intervention, i.e. the material world in which issues are embedded.
The idea is to try and improve the knowledge of the causes and consequences of planning
issues and how policies might help to respond to them. This response to conditions of
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uncertainty is based on a pragmatist line of thought (e.g. Dewey, 1920, 1929; Friedman,
1987) and focuses on experimentation in planning and policy making. Planning instruments
and approaches are considered as experiments and, once applied in practice, need to be
closely monitored to gain insight into whether and how these are successful in dealing with
planning issues to trigger processes of learning and reflection.
In her paper, ‘Coping with Uncertainty in Planning’, Karen Christensen already hinted
towards the need to use both routes to cope with conditions of uncertainty in 1985. On the
one hand, she highlighted the importance of bargaining over alternative policy objectives
(Figure 1, Line A). It is here where we find the need for ‘making sense together’. On the
other hand, she also highlighted the need for processes of learning and experimentation as
ways to reduce uncertainties about the means to achieve agreed upon goals to try to reduce
uncertainties (Figure 1, Line B). After 1985, the increased dominance of the ‘communicative
turn’ almost concealed this second route. But the incorporation within planning and policy
making of approaches related to complexity sciences (e.g. De Roo and Silva, 2010), soft
systems thinking (e.g. Checkland, 2000; Checkland and Scholes, 1990), and social learning
(e.g. Folke et al., 2005; Lee, 1993; Moulaert, 2013; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Reed et al., 2010) is
now producing a renewed interest in learning and experimentation. Furthermore, it is a
renewed interest that seems to unite both routes mentioned for coping with conditions of
uncertainty.
Learning pursued
Recently, a broad range of writings emerged on more adaptive forms of governance
(cf. Chaffin et al., 2016). In adaptive forms of governance, organisations and coalitions
use experimentation, monitoring and reflection through debate to increase their understand-
ing of the practices they have to deal with. That is: coping with uncertainty is based on being
able to adapt to newly emerging knowledge and ideas, where learning is the process
providing the required input on creating such knowledge and ideas (e.g. Ahern, 2011;
Brunner, 2010; Paavola et al., 2009). Learning, however, is now not seen as preoccupied
with experimentation in the material world. Instead, learning is the result of a two-way















Figure 1. Planning approaches in response to uncertainty. Source: Christensen (1985).
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effects of planning actions, while open communication and debate help establishing what
this information means with regard to defining the problem, the policy objectives to pursue
and the strategies to adopt (Figure 1, Lines A and B).
The rise of literature on adaptive forms of governance has brought the process of learning
back to the forefront of academic debates in planning and policy sciences. Nevertheless,
details on how we might proceed to learn and adapt often remain relatively general, while
also modest use is made of literature of organisational sciences and of existing proposals for
organisational adaptation and learning (e.g. Gupta et al., 2006; Levitt and March, 1988;
March, 1991; March and Olsen, 2006; McGrath, 2001). We consider this modest use unfor-
tunate, especially regarding the use of the twin-concept of exploration and exploitation for
fuelling organisational learning as advanced by James March (1991). On the one hand, as
also March and Olsen (2006) explain, planners and policy makers should focus on the
exploration of new possibilities and on experimentation with new alternatives. This allows
them to proceed from a better base of understanding on the effects of policies in practice and
to sharpen predictions on how such policies can help to respond to planning issues. On the
other hand, as March and Olsen (2006) argue, finding appropriate answers also involves the
exploitation of existing capabilities – or as March (1991) phrases it: ‘the refinement and
extension of existing competences, technologies and paradigms’ (p. 85). After all, if a plan-
ning approach proves to be successful in a specific context in space and time, this does not
mean that this will also be the case in other contexts. The approach will have to be tested
and refined to become more generally applicable.
Exploration and exploitation should be combined with each other to foster learning
processes (March, 1991). Planners and policy makers focussing too much on the exploration
of new knowledge and on developing innovative policy approaches risk overlooking the
need for refining and adopting existing approaches so as to create efficiencies through rou-
tine operations. Rather, they might overflow decision makers with new ideas, options and
learning opportunities, while many options have only been superficially explored and a clear
frame of reference to interpret new findings is lacking. Alternatively, planners and policy
makers also face the risk of focussing too strongly on exploitation, resulting in the prema-
ture acceptance that new findings make that issues are well understood and that the
approaches used are equipped to deal with them. The result is not just that attempts to
identify or anticipate changing or unforeseen circumstances are largely redundant; existing
policies and programmes might also become increasingly rigid and inflexible to cope with
such circumstances.
A synthesis
Combining exploration and exploitation can now be connected to the two-way learning
process focussed on both experimentation in the material world and the inter-subjective
realm in which different interpretations and values influence how learning takes place (see
Figure 2). Firstly, experimentation with alternative planning actions, and monitoring suc-
cesses or failure, helps us understand which technologies and actions within the scope of a
programme ‘work’ (see Figure 2, Line B). Exploration comes forward in experimenting with
alternative options, developing new options and evaluating which options work. In the
realm of air quality policies, these could be options such as road pricing strategies, traffic
management, improved air pollutant filters, attempts to influence the modal split, etc.
Exploitation, instead, takes one strategy and aims to refine it, i.e. the alternative has been
chosen and the attempt is to improve its effectiveness.
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Secondly, learning also involves inter-subjective debate on interpreting and valuing newly
emerging information in relation to problem definitions and policy objectives (see Figure 2,
Line A). Exploration means the programme enables debates on the trade-off between
objectives to pursue, the height of these ambitions and reflecting on the problem definition.
In the case of air pollution, exploration might involve discussing the economic impact of
strict air quality standards, or the gap between the strict WHO guidelines and the more
lenient EU standards. Exploitation, instead, is focussed on fine-tuning the problem defini-
tion and programme goals. This might involve a refinement on the exact role of car traffic in
contributing to air pollution.
Under conditions of uncertainty it is, however, unlikely that experimentation and mon-
itoring will swiftly produce clarity upon which alternatives are successful, while conditions
influencing success can easily change. Therefore, as Christensen (1985) also discusses, there
is always the risk of ‘premature programming’, where ‘from a narrow set of alternatives, a
particular proposed but unproven technology is selected, and then implemented through
prescribed procedures and organisational mandates, as if the technology were already
proven effective’ (p. 69). It is, to use our words, the risk that at some point in we forget
explorative strategies that enable us to adapt, but instead create a lock-in of relying on only
a narrow set of strategies that only allow for some degree of exploitation. As indicated by
Salet et al. (2013), this risk is especially prominent when a policy or programme moves from
one phase or decision-making round to another. They, for example, show how options
enabling adaptation are present in early planning stages but quickly vaporise in implemen-
tation stages as a result of approaching deadlines and decreasing budgets. Moreover, these
options are also no more explored as, especially during implementation, the tendency
to simplify and revert to existing strategies increases. A new decision-making round may
also emerge when the electoral cycles create a new political order and as a result shared
knowledge, experience and memory disappear. In these circumstances, policy options that
already have been explored and selected run the risk to be either forgotten or to be taken for
granted and accordingly perceived as something that does not need political attention any-
more (e.g. Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).
At the same time, under conditions of uncertainty, it is also unlikely that conflicting
interpretations, values and preferences will easily converge to common perspectives, while
changes are likely to occur over time. Consequently, Christensen (1985) warns us about































Figure 2. Processes of exploration and exploitation.
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no longer considered as political choices and tradeoffs that need to be discussed and publicly
debated, but simply ignored by curtailing ‘debates between specialties in such a way that
each specialty’s goal appears acceptable’ (p. 70). In our words, the risk is now that we forget
to reinterpret and adapt our objectives and definitions in the face of new information and
ideas. This can occur when the parameters for debate are set in such a narrow way that there
is little room for more fundamental discussion in which the existing perspectives on ambi-
tions, trade-offs and choices is challenged. As discussed by Bickerstaff and Walker (2005),
agendas for debate often reinforce rather than challenge existing power relations. This
means that processes of learning, reflection and debate need not only have to occur in a
communicative fashion, but also need to be organised in a way that it can ‘forcefully and
repeatedly challenge [. . .] entrenched structures of authority’ (Tschakert et al., 2016: 192).
‘Premature programming’ and ‘premature consensus’ both describe situations in which
exploitation is pursued at the expense of exploration. In both cases, learning is limited to
optimisation of existing goals, instruments and knowledge. New knowledge about changed
conditions, alternative trade-offs, or instruments is not searched for and, with a focus on
optimisation, possibly even undesirable. As discussed above, such new knowledge, however,
is exactly what is crucial if we want programmes as the Dutch NSL to be adaptive on the
basis of an on-going learning process. To avoid ‘premature programming’ and ‘premature
consensus’, the organisational setup of adaptive policies and programmes should ensure that
learning will not be limited to exploitation, but also involves exploration. Examples include
not only monitoring schemes helping us to gain awareness of the practical impacts of pol-
icies (Figure 2, Line B), but also agreements or contracts that oblige stakeholders to evaluate
their course of action and rethink and revise their tools and objectives in the face of new
knowledge or unforeseen developments (Figure 2, Line A).
Research approach
In our study of the NSL, we explicitly analysed how the process of learning and adaptation
was organised. Most notably, we used our theoretical conclusions as input for our analysis,
hoping that they might set us on the right path for explaining the NSL’s lack of success in
adapting. The choice to focus on the NSL is informed by our surprise of its lack of success in
adapting to new knowledge and changed circumstances, despite being meant to do exactly
that. An on-going process of learning-by-doing should have enabled the NSL to adapt to
‘changed circumstances and insights that are likely to emerge’ (VROM et al., 2009: 24).
In practice, however, adaptation within the scope of the NSL proves cumbersome
(e.g. Busscher et al., 2014; EK, 2013; TK, 2014). To illustrate, even though the monitoring
results show that the programme is not sufficient in reducing air pollution to the extent that
was agreed upon (RIVM, 2014), the responsible minister still claims that ‘there is no need to
re-evaluate whether the existing strategies to reduce air pollution are still adequate’ (I&M,
2013: 7).
In addition, though, we also used the NSL as a case to reflect on the current use of the
notion of ‘learning’ within academic debates on more adaptive forms of governance. That is,
next to our prime motive of trying to understand the NSL’s lack of success in adapting, we
also mean to explicitly reflect on the theoretical arguments made in the section ‘Coping with
uncertainty’. After all, the NSL can be seen as a ‘deviant’ (Flybjerg, 2006; Seawright and
Gerring, 2008) or ‘negative’ (Emigh, 1997) case study: both its theoretically predicted out-
come – that learning leads to adaptation – as well as it practical ambition – to adapt to
changing circumstances – have not been realised. According to literature, deviant or nega-
tive case studies are especially helpful to probe new or additional explanations about
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expected relationships. In this article, we will, therefore, also use the NSL to further our
insights on how the organisation of learning processes influences the extent to which policies
and programmes can adapt in response to uncertainty and changing circumstances.
Our study is based on an extensive set of sources: interviews, focus group discussions,
policy documents and academic publications about the programme. The principle research-
er has conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with open-ended thematic ques-
tions. All interviews were audio-recorded. The researcher also took notes during the
interviews. The interviews have been worked up on the basis of both the recording and
the notes.
The interviews took place in three different rounds. The first round of interviews
was conducted in 2009–2010 in the early stages of working with the NSL. The interviews
focussed on the development and organisation of the programme. In this round, 41
interviews were conducted with actors involved in the programme. This included public
officials, consultants and lawyers involved in the development and implementation of the
NSL. Most of them were specialists in air quality matters, although they had different
backgrounds varying from technical issues as modelling and the dissipation of polluted
air to legal aspects and process organisation. All of them were working for the Ministry
of Transport, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (merged into
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment in 2010), provinces, municipalities,
supporting government agencies, interest organisations, or consultancy and law firms. In
this round, interviewees were selected using a dual design of strategic sampling and snowball
sampling. Key actors were identified through publicly available minutes of key meetings and
conferences in preparation of the NSL, government issued policy documents and academic
publications. Interviewees were also asked to others considered influential in the air qual-
ity dossier.
In 2011, in a later stage of working with the NSL, we followed up on 13 interviewees of
the first round that held key positions; i.e. they were directly involved in drafting the NSL or
implementing it in key national or provincial agencies. In this round, we reflected on how
the programme responded or could respond to changed circumstances and contextual devel-
opments. We asked interviewees what they considered to be important contextual develop-
ments, whether and how these developments triggered any learning within the programme
and if so, whether this triggered adaptations to the programme.
The last interview round was conducted in 2013 in the final stages of the NSL. In this
round, 13 interviews were held in which we largely addressed the same aspects as in the
second round. In comparison to the second round of interviews, however, this time we also
asked stakeholders to evaluate whether the programme lived up to their expectations (for-
mulated in the first round) and which factors had played a role in either confirming or
contradicting their expectations. Furthermore, we also asked them to assess in a more
general sense whether the NSL had been able to respond to conditions of uncertainty.
In the analysis of the interviews, we manually looked for overarching themes or patterns
in the organisation, triggers and occurrence of learning. Key themes were identified based on
their research relevance, how often a theme was mentioned, and the extent to which it
marked differences between different (groups) of stakeholders (e.g. Salet et al., 2013;
Tschakert et al., 2016) and were discussed by the researchers in the team. Although
themes were primarily based on the responses of the interviewees thus following an inductive
approach, we linked the themes that were found back to existing literature. As such, the
analysis was based on a combination of an inductive and deductive approach (Hennink
et al., 2010; Ritchie et al., 2013).
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We found that although the NSL was ‘officially meant’ as an adaptive programme, in
practice, it was used as an ‘excuse’ to simply postpone some of the solutions. To gain insight
and reflect on how this was perceived, we also organised two focus group discussions.
The first focus group consisted of participants primarily focused on road infrastructure
development. They mostly needed the NSL to ensure they could continue with their proj-
ects. They originated particularly from Rijkswaterstaat – the executive agency of the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, which is responsible for the planning and
construction of the national highway system. We used insights from the first focus group
to stimulate the discussion in the second focus group. This group tended more towards
seeing the NSL as a start for a ‘real solution’. It consisted of participants that were stake-
holders involved in the implementation of the NSL and originated from law firms and
national, provincial and municipal government organisations.
Coping with uncertainty in practice: The NSL
The NSL had a dual objective: ‘to improve the air quality and the public health and to
enable the implementation of spatial and infrastructure projects’ (VROM et al., 2009).
The programme was developed after European air quality standards, as specified in air
quality directive 1999/30EC, were incorporated into Dutch law and it appeared that these
standards were transgressed in large parts of the country. As a result, not only infrastructure
projects from the Ministry of Transport could no longer proceed, also smaller projects on
lower levels of authority – parking garages, new residential neighbourhoods, etc. –
were halted.
The programme is based on a collaborative effort of those government organisations that
were affected by the halting of spatial and infrastructure projects. These government organ-
isations are the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment (VROM), 7 provinces, and 195 municipalities. All these parties signed a con-
tract that details the kind of measures each will take in the subsequent years to improve air
quality. To illustrate, ministries agreed, inter alia, to implement a national road pricing
scheme and erect barriers along highways, provinces agreed to clean up their car fleet,
and municipalities agreed to encourage cycling, introduce environmental zones and imple-
ment strict parking policies.
These mitigating measures were assessed on the basis of a newly developed national
monitoring tool. The monitoring tool showed that at the start of the programme ‘the set
of mitigating measures [was] amply sufficient’ as an interviewed national policy officer
explained. To monitor if implemented measures also would sort their anticipated effect in
practice and to check whether all parties would do their share (VROM et al., 2009), mon-
itoring would occur on an annual basis during the implementation of the programme.
The monitoring results would be shown on publicly available websites (www.nsl-monitor
ing.nl and www.atlasleefomgeving.nl/kijken). To ensure that monitoring would occur on an
independent basis, the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM)
was asked to organise and coordinate the monitoring process.
The contract that was signed by all involved government organisations also specified
what was to be done in case the monitoring would produce unexpected results.
It specified, for example, what was to occur in case some mitigating measures were failing.
If this would happen, then involved stakeholders would investigate the situation in order to
both interpret and make sense of the results, and assess to what extent the programme
would suffice. In other words, the participants explicitly agreed that this would trigger a
process of learning that would lead to adaptations to the programme. The organisation of
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this learning process, however, in terms of mandate, division of roles and responsibilities
was not specified. It was merely agreed that the success of the NSL was a collective respon-
sibility and that in case of unforeseen circumstances, the involved actors would investigate
to what extent current mitigating measures could be optimised or expanded (exploitation) or
whether additional mitigating measures could be developed and implemented (exploration).
In both cases, if additional action implied the need of additional funding, this was to be
made available by the involved actors themselves following their own political decision-
making processes; the initial budget of e1.5 billion that was provided by the Ministry of
VROM had all been allocated. In both cases, also, experimenting with creating better
‘means’ within the frame of the existing NSL could take place without contesting the
‘goals’ – the scope and balance between the objectives of the NSL (Figure 2, Line B).
The NSL, however, also allowed for individual projects to be removed from the programme,
shifting the balance in its dual objectives (VROM et al., 2009). In doing so, therefore, the
NSL did allow for its scope and dual objectives itself to be debated (Figure 2, Line A). With
these possibilities, participants considered the NSL to be quite able to adapt and flex to
changing circumstances. Based on the idea that programme found a way to unite the mul-
tiple interests at stake and would be flexible in the face of possible drawbacks, hopes were
high that with the NSL the Dutch would be able to break the lock-in situation they found
themselves in after implementing the EU Directive.
Learning in the NSL
The focus group discussions and the interviews show, however, that despite the high expect-
ations, the implementation of the NSL ran into trouble. In both the focus group discussion
and the interviews, it was mentioned that initially, in 2009, all stakeholders were confident
that the measures installed would be sufficient to both realise infrastructure projects and
meet air quality standards. In the course of time, however, the monitoring tool consistently
showed disappointing effects of the mitigating measures that have been implemented.
For example, in practice, the emissions of cars and trucks with a so-called ‘Euro
5-engine’ (a cleaner engine) emitted: ‘emissions of nitrogen dioxide that are three times
higher than expected beforehand’ (Ligterink et al., 2009: 2), which left the major cities in
the Netherlands faced with a serious challenge. On the basis of these disappointing moni-
toring results, it could be expected that – in line with the agreements between all parties – a
learning process would be initiated that focused on investigating and assessing to what
extent the current design of the programme still can sufficiently achieve the dual objectives
of the NSL. Based on interpreting the results of on-going monitoring, stakeholders would
first assess whether they needed to either alter or refine the scope and balance between the
objectives of the programme (Figure 2, Line A) and secondly, to assess how to improve or
expand the measures and actions taken (Figure 2, Line B).
Narrowing scopes
Faced with the disappointing monitoring results, it was indeed clear that those involved with
the NSL were first facing questions regarding the scope and balance between the objectives of
the programme. As a legal expert explains: ‘either the amount infrastructure projects that
deteriorate the air quality is decreased, or the amount of mitigating measures that improve
the air quality is increased’. The first option would imply stakeholders discussing the monitor-
ing results so as to exploit possibilities to refine their understanding of what the NSL’s dual
objective meant in practice regarding balancing air quality and constructing new infrastructure
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projects, or possibly, to even explore whether the NSLs scope and dual objective had to be
adjusted (Figure 2, Line A). This first option was not considered preferable. Instead, it became
apparent that as a municipal policy officer explains: ‘almost everybody is participating in
the programme in order to be able to build again’. Because the European air quality standards
are also essential to be reached, the balance between the objectives of the NSL remained
untouched. This is also reflected in the conclusions of a focus group discussion on ‘how to
proceed’ where participants felt: ‘there is no room to discuss over the objectives again’. This
conclusion was not just based on interests and choices of most of the NSL’s participants; it was
also based on a changed political climate. The 2010 national elections significantly changed the
Dutch national political landscape. The interviews revealed that the in comparison to
the ‘Balkenende IV’ Cabinet in 2009, the new ‘Rutte’ Cabinets (both Rutte-I and II) were
much more oriented towards spatial and infrastructure development to stimulate the national
economy and much less towards its environmental consequences. Faced with a new political
landscape, the VROM quickly realised that ‘the discussion on environmental policies would
have to take place on the background as these policies might constrain the small economic
growth that this Cabinet cherishes so much’. Complemented with a Ministry of Transport that
quite clearly indicated that it was part of the NSL ‘to be able to construct our projects again’,
the debate on the monitoring results was organised by the national government in such a way
that discussions on how to interpret the monitoring results, on validating the degree of progress
being made, and on making possible changes or additions to the NSL were marginalised.
For example, when critical issues regarding the dual objectives of the programme were
raised by the RIVM, the institute that independently performed the annual monitoring, civil
servants of the Ministry of VROM criticised the RIVM for being ‘politically insensitive’ and
accused them to ‘speak before their turn’ as mentioned by a national policy officer. This not
only means that there was no room for exploitive learning regarding what the dual objective
actually meant in practice, but that it was also not possible to explore the degree in which the
NSL might have to be reframed in scope and focus (Figure 2, Line A). Instead, the agenda of
the debate was limited by the national government and focused only on whether existing
mitigating measures could be improved and expanded or whether new mitigating measures
might have to be adopted. In response, as the focus group participants also noted, learning was
confined to a focus on how to improve the ‘means’ for a successful implementation of the NSL
(Figure 2, Line B).
Ensuring programme success solely on this basis, however, proved to be challenging.
Decentralised governments as the municipality of Rotterdam, for example, were confronted
with ‘transgressions of the environmental standards of over 8mg/m3, while their most effec-
tive mitigating measure proved to be an environmental zone, which reduced concentrations
with 0.1mg/m3, as mentioned in the focus group discussions. In other words, the decentral-
ised government agencies quickly realised that the only way to ensure that the European
standards will be met everywhere in the Netherlands is to collaboratively take additional
mitigating measures. On this, the decentralised governments particularly urged the central
government to do more and adopt or stimulate the adopting of new mitigating measures on
a national scale. It was essentially a call for national leadership in trying to stimulate the
kind of learning upon existing and new measures and how best to implement them. Practice,
however, would turn out differently.
Risks of failure?
The changed political landscape significantly influenced the NSL. First, it made that ‘the
search for additional mitigating measures was greatly complicated’ as a national policy
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officer explained in the interviews. This would require additional funding, while political
priorities had shifted. Second, it also caused that important existing mitigating measures
to be taken by the national government, such as a nation-wide road pricing, were
annulled because political support for the initiatives had vaporised (e.g. Smaal, 2012).
Furthermore, to add insult to injury, under the changed political leadership the decision
was also made to increase the maximum speed on many highways from 120 to 130 km/h
despite the extra air pollution this generates. Third, whereas the decentralised govern-
ments had hoped for the central government to step in and help the involved stake-
holders to take more mitigating measures, they had ‘to conclude that the central
government is merely undertaking counterproductive measures’ as a provincial policy
officer put it.
Without the leadership of the national government, debates on improving,
expanding or adding mitigating measures within the NSL further marginalised, creating
what appears to be an ‘NSL fatigue’. As a policy officer from the Ministry of
VROM explained:
We are a policy department. We initiate policies and programmes, we do not implement them.
Creating elbow room during implementation by engaging in political debates is not something
we enjoy. I have wondered many times why we, as initiators, are also considered to take the lead
in the implementation.
Within this atmosphere, explorative learning on possible new measures was hardly pur-
sued at all. Moreover, even exploitive learning upon how to expand existing measures
and transferring successful practices to other places was limited. During the interviews, a
national policy officer first of all concluded that the NSL ‘simply does not contain a
structure for different participants to learn from each other’. When it is asked why there
is no stakeholder initiating this, the interviews subsequently make clear that all stake-
holders feel that the national government should organise this. At the same time, how-
ever, they also conclude that the department within the national government that should
do so is primarily focused on ‘showing to the European Union that we are doing well’,
while they also suggest that ‘they simply do not have the capacity to also explicitly
facilitate learning processes’.
Without actively engaging in processes of learning from past successes and failures, most
stakeholders in the NSL have started to focus on their own task and initiated processes of
exploitation to optimise their own existing set of mitigating measures (Figure 2, Line B). The
intention of individual stakeholders is to improve their own set of mitigating measures to
such an extent that ‘they just meet the European standards in their jurisdiction and to cut all
possible redundancy and slack from their set of mitigating measures to arrive at an optimal
cost-benefit ratio’, as explained by a municipal policy officer. In this process, as is mentioned
in the second focus group discussion ‘the monitoring tool prescribes what you can do and
what you cannot do’. In other words, as another participant added, ‘to a certain extent the
monitoring tool has become our reality’.
The learning now taking place within the context of the NSL is clearly marginalised.
Centred on a monitoring tool that informs upon the degree of progress being made, learning
is little more than adjusting detailed planning actions in ‘a numbers game in which we try to
calculate concentrations of pollutants to several decimals behind the comma’. It has become
something as ‘MoT testing an old car’ as a legal expert claims: when an old car runs into
trouble in the annual test with regard to safety and road worthiness, owners typically try to
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get it back on the road with as little investment as necessary. In a similar vein, monitoring in
the NSL has become a matter of
ticking the boxes to show that we are on the right track. In case we cannot tick a certain box we
first check whether this is not a mistake in the monitoring tool. If not, then the stakeholder who
encounters the problem usually comes up with a stopgap remedy and hopes that it will hold in
the next monitoring round.
This also means that ‘fundamental discussions on how to interpret these results are not
being held nor do we reassess made agreements’. Hopes and expectations of an adaptive and
flexible programme that would use a learning-by-doing strategy to be improved, therefore,
are not the reality of the NSL. With the NSL, the Dutch hoped and expected to arrive at a
situation in which the concentrations of pollutants in ambient air would be all below or even
far below what the European standards prescribe. During the last interview rounds, this
optimism was greatly nuanced: ‘we end up transgressing the environmental standards in
almost all major cities in the Netherlands’ as a municipal policy officer denotes. As a result,
as a provincial policy officer puts it, despite the tremendous efforts that the Dutch have
made, it appears as if ‘we have ended up in just another lock-in situation’.
Discussion and conclusion
The stimulus of this article was our surprise about the lack of learning and adaptation
within the NSL while the programme was explicitly organised to be adaptive on the basis
of an on-going learning process. In this article, we aimed to explain why this lack occurred.
Based on our findings, we can also reflect on how adaptive strategies can benefit from the
learning taking place during their development and implementation.
If learning wants to support adaptive strategies and programmes, it should be organised
focusing both on improving the knowledge of the effects of possible policy strategies and
solutions in the ‘material world’ and on bargaining and negotiation in which we interpret
and ‘make sense’ of such knowledge. In doing so, learning can benefit from two comple-
mentary processes, one focussed on exploring new ways to understand and approach prob-
lems, the other one focussed on exploiting existing knowledge, measures and capabilities by
optimising and refining them. For policies and programmes such as the NSL, this means
that these should allow for debates so as to make sense of new information and findings, and
allow for a continuous interaction between exploitation and exploration. Otherwise, these
policies and programmes run the risk of what Christensen (1985) referred to as ‘premature
programming’ and ‘premature consensus’, which will undermine the capacity of a pro-
gramme to adapt to changing circumstances. In retrospect, we can conclude that the NSL
failed to anticipate both these risks and consequently also failed to adapt.
Our analysis reveals that debates after the monitoring tool showed disappointing results
were soon marginalised and gravitated towards exploitation at the expense of exploration.
On the one hand, the ruling political and administrative mind-set surrounding the NSL
meant that sense-making, negotiation and debate was to take place within strict parameters.
This limited learning and meant there was no room for explorative learning regarding the
meaning of its dual objective in practice, nor regarding the degree in which the NSL might
have to be adapted in scope or focus. This is a classic example of ‘premature consensus’, well
illustrated by participants responses that ‘there is no room to discuss over the objectives
again’. On the other hand, there was also limited room for explorative learning on possible
new measures, while even exploitive learning upon how to improve and expand existing
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measures was limited. Faced with a national government that annulled some key existing
measures, most stakeholders refrain from any active exchange of knowledge and practices.
The result is not only a ‘NSL fatigue’, but also that instead of the intended collaborative
learning process, individual stakeholders started to focus on exploiting the measures already
being part of the initial NSL, while putting most effort in optimising them so as to pass the
‘sort of MoT test’ the monitoring tool has become. The lack of leadership, fragmented
learning process and short-term focus clearly undermined the capacity of the NSL to
adapt to changing circumstances and demonstrate how NSL also suffers from ‘premature
programming’.
Because of the ill-organised learning process, the NSL has been unable to adapt to
changing circumstances. This means it is now failing to comply with European air quality
standards. This effectively leaves participants are with two possible options. The first is to
accept the situation as it is and face the possible consequences of non-compliance. This,
however, is something that appears to be unacceptable to anti-pollution groups in the
Netherlands. ‘Friends of the Earth Netherlands’ recently sued the Dutch government
because the NSL is not living up to its promises. Early September 2017, the court ruled
in favour of the anti-pollution group and forced the Dutch state to take action so as to
ensure that the European air quality standards will be met everywhere in the country. This
pushes the participants in the NSL towards the option, that is to initiate a fresh round of
exploration; both with regards to the objectives of the NSL and with regards to its policy
measures. Moreover, it also compels the Dutch national government undertake this under
their leadership.
This, of course, could have happened much earlier already. The involved actors often
considered the central government to take up the leadership role. However, through time, its
actions have proved to be heavily influenced by changing political imperatives. The learning
process was clearly limited, additional funding was not made available, and important
measures were annulled. To safeguard the programme against changes in the political land-
scape, it might have been wise to appoint such leadership to a more independent organisa-
tion that is provided with the necessary tools and instruments to not only stimulate that
learning takes place, but also to ensure that this occurs with regard to both experimentation
and bargaining, negotiation and debate. Conversely, also the exact opposite strategy would
have been an option. The NSL exhibits an indirect but influential relationship between
politics, with regard to the decisions that new ministers made, and the ministries themselves.
It shows how politicians can take counterproductive decisions with regard to a programme
that the ministry tries to implement. Largely, this is a result of the fact that the ministers
responsible in the different phases of the programme, i.e. the development, implementation
and finalisation, will be different for each phase and thus political reliability becomes more
elusive. Preventing this from happening and would imply a much closer link between the
consequences of political decision-making and political responsibility for the success of the
programme. This, could, for example, by organised by linking annual budgets, to be made
available to new infrastructure projects, to the annual monitoring. This would have urged
the Dutch national government to a political debate that also includes discussing new tools
and approaches as well as the objectives to pursue and choices to make.
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